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Aims: This study sought to address two questions: (1) what is the inter-rater reliability
of the Dysexecutive Questionnaire (DEX) when completed by patients, their significant
others, and clinicians; and (2) does the factor structure of the DEX vary for these three
groups?
Methods: We obtained DEX ratings for 113 patients with an acquired brain injury from
two brain injury services in the UK and two services in Ireland. We gathered data from
two groups of raters—”significant others” (DEX-SO) such as partners and close family
members and “clinicians” (DEX-C), who were psychologists or rehabilitation physicians
working closely with the patient and who were able to provide an opinion about the
patient’s level of everyday executive functioning. Intra-class correlation coefficients and
their 95% confidence intervals were calculated between each of the three groups (self,
significant other, clinician). Principal axis factor (PAF) analyses were also conducted for
each of the three groups.
Results: The factor analysis revealed a consistent one-factor model for each of the
three groups of raters. However, the inter-rater reliability analyses showed a low level of
agreement between the self-ratings and the ratings of the two groups of independent
raters. We also found low agreement between the significant others and the clinicians.
Conclusion: Although there was a consistent finding of a single factor solution for each
of the three groups, the low level of agreement between significant others and clinicians
raises a question about the reliability of the DEX.
Keywords: brain injury, dysexecutive, reliability, factor analysis, care giver
INTRODUCTION
Impaired self-awareness is a common cognitive deficit after trau-
matic brain injury and can lead to problems with self-monitoring
and behavioral self-regulation (McBrinn et al., 2008). These prob-
lems may contribute to difficulties undertaking many everyday
functions such as engaging in interpersonal communication, bud-
geting, household chores and carrying out vocational activities
(Godbout et al., 2005). The cognitive capacities associated with
self-awareness and self-regulation are considered to be part of the
executive system in the frontal lobes of the brain. Executive func-
tions include cognitive operations that contribute to the ability
to initiate, inhibit and integrate other functions, simultaneously
termed supervisory, attentional or control processes (Shallice
and Burgess, 1991; Miyake et al., 2000; Stuss and Alexander,
2007).
A cluster of symptoms associated with these functions is
thought to present in “dysexecutive syndrome”, the central com-
ponent of the cluster being impairment in self-awareness and
self-regulation (Morton and Barker, 2010). This impairment is
assumed to arise from damage to critical areas of the brain that are
integral to behavioral self-regulation, typically the frontal lobes.
There is, however, growing recognition that self-awareness is a
highly complex and multifaceted process that is not exclusive
to the frontal lobes. Efforts to identify specific brain areas that
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may be responsible for self-monitoring and self-regulation have
led researchers to acknowledge that multiple pathways may be
involved—impaired self-awareness does not appear to be linked
exclusively to focal or generalized brain damage or to specific
neurocognitive test profiles (Philippi et al., 2012; Caldwell et al.,
2014; Ham et al., 2014).
While the study of the underlying processes involved in
impaired self-regulation continues, clinicians agree that the
capacity for self-monitoring and behavioral self-regulation is
important to successful rehabilitation outcomes after brain injury
(Winkens et al., 2014). To that end, clinicians are reliant on exist-
ing psychometric tools for identifying and quantifying impaired
self-regulation. However, measurement of executive ability is
challenging as executive function tests are not process-pure—
they will invariably and unavoidably involve other non-executive
functions that may be variously spared or compromised after
brain injury (Barker et al., 2010). One commonly used measure
of the behavioral manifestation of dysexecutive impairment is the
Dysexecutive Questionnaire (DEX; Wilson et al., 1997). The DEX
is purported to be an ecologically valid test; that is, it provides
an estimation of executive function as applied to everyday life
challenges. The interpretation of the DEX score is based on
the difference between the client’s self-report and the report of
another person who knows the client well, with any resultant
discrepancy assumed to reflect a lack of self-awareness in the
brain-injured person.
As a relatively quick and easy questionnaire to complete, the
DEX offers an appealing method of quantifying a complex neu-
ropsychological process. However, the utility of the test relies on
two important premises: (1) the third party respondent can give a
true and accurate account of the injured person’s functioning; and
(2) the psychometric validity of the measurement tool is constant
across users (i.e., both client and independent rater “versions”
are measuring the same construct or factor[s]). Each of these
premises is considered briefly.
Regarding the first premise, there is certainly evidence that
patient self-reports differ from the reports of their significant
others. This finding is not unexpected as the DEX is designed
to identify discrepancies in scores that may reflect impairment in
self-awareness in people following brain injury. However, some
evidence suggests that independent raters may not respond in a
similar way about the same person. For example, a study of the
inter-rater reliability of the ratings of family members found a
low level of agreement among three independent raters reporting
about the same individual with a brain injury (Barker et al.,
2011). The authors concluded that all raters do not respond
in a comparable manner and, thus, it would be erroneous for
clinicians to assume that DEX ratings by significant others are
always accurate (Barker et al., 2011). The problem of ascertaining
whether a rating by a family member is accurate is more complex
than it may appear. For example, if one does not use independent
ratings of the level of impaired awareness of the person with brain
injury, then the other main source of information is objective
neuropsychological data. However, the situation here is far from
clear—there is not a direct correlation between overall severity
of cognitive impairment and level of impaired self-awareness or
between scores on specific tests of executive function and level
of impaired self-awareness (Barker et al., 2004). Thus, there are
ongoing questions regarding the precise nature of impaired self-
awareness, its link to overall executive functioning, and the extent
to which the construct can be measured by existing questionnaire-
based tools.
With respect to the second premise of whether the DEX self-
rated questionnaire measures the same construct(s) as the DEX
completed by independent others, several studies have examined
the factor structure of the DEX focusing on DEX self-ratings.
Variable findings have been obtained. For instance, a study using
a large community sample of more than 1100 people identified
a single underlying factor (Gerstorf et al., 2008). Conversely,
a study using non-clinical (N = 293) and clinical (N = 49)
samples found a 4-factor solution with factors best described
as inhibition, intention, social regulation, and abstract problem-
solving (Mooney et al., 2006). A 4-factor model also was identified
by Bodenburg and Dopslaff (2008); however, based on different
loadings, their interpretations of these factors were: initiating and
sustaining actions, impulse control, psychophysical and mental
excitability, and social conventions. A study of the factor structure
of the DEX in the context of normal aging (Amieva et al.,
2003) identified a 5-factor solution: intentionality, interference
management, inhibition, planning, and social regulation. Thus,
substantial variability is evident in the dimensionality of the
DEX.
Only one previous study has tested the factor structure of the
DEX amongst independent raters. Using the significant others
of 46 adults with varying neurological conditions, that study
obtained a 3-factor solution described as behavioral inhibi-
tion, goal-directed behavior/intentionality, and executive mem-
ory/cognition (Chaytor and Schmitter-Edgecombe, 2007). No
studies have yet examined the factor structure of the DEX when
completed by independent raters who are reporting about the
degree of impairment associated with acquired brain injury.
Further, no previous study has compared the factor structure of
the DEX when completed by two or more independent raters
in relation to the same patient. The fundamental questions
addressed by this study are: (1) what are the levels of inter-rater
consistency when the DEX is completed by patients, significant
others, and clinicians; and (2) does the dimensionality of the DEX
vary as a function of the individuals completing it (e.g., client
vs. clinician)?
METHOD
MEASURES
The Behavioral Assessment of the Dysexecutive Syndrome
(BADS) is considered an ecologically valid, multidimensional
measure of executive function comprising six sub-tests and
a questionnaire which probes symptoms of Dysexecutive syn-
drome, called the DEX (Wilson et al., 1997). The DEX is a 20-
item questionnaire which the authors describe as having three
factors assessing everyday changes in cognition, emotion and
behavior after an acquired brain injury or other brain trauma.
The DEX is completed by the patient (self-rating: DEX-S) and by
a person who knows the patient well (independent rater). In this
study, we gathered data from two groups of independent raters—
“significant others” (DEX-SO) such as partners and close family
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members and “clinicians” (DEX-C), who were psychologists or
rehabilitation physicians working closely with the patient and
who were able to provide an opinion about the patient’s level of
everyday executive functioning.
Ethical Approval: Each participant and their significant other
provided consent to take part and each of the participating
services received ethical approval from their local institutional
research ethics committee.
PARTICIPANTS
The number of patients included in this study was 113 (87 males,
M age = 37.77, SD = 12.76; 26 females, M age = 38.96, SD = 12.06)
from two brain injury services in the UK and two services in
Ireland. The participants were identified by the service managers
and clinicians by virtue of being a client of the service and
meeting the inclusion criteria. Inclusion criteria for the study
were: 18 years or older, had experienced an acquired brain injury,
had sufficient cognitive and physical ability to give informed
consent to participate, able to read and respond to the question-
naires. Exclusion criteria were major psychiatric illness or cogni-
tive impairment of such severity that would prevent the ability
to consent and/or to respond to the questionnaires. None of
those identified by the services as potentially suitable participants
refused to participate. In each center, an unspecified number of
patients were deemed by the clinician or service manager to not
meet the inclusion criteria. The sample in the study would, in
the authors’ view, be considered typical of those accessing brain
injury support services in the UK and Ireland with moderately
severe brain injury. All were in the post-acute phase of rehabili-
tation, typically receiving support services focused on optimizing
independent functioning. The mean duration of injury was 57.49
months (SD = 44.24), with minimal and maximal time periods
of 10 months and 168 months, respectively. The median for
duration was 36 months (25th percentile = 24 months; 75th
percentile = 84 months). Type of injury data indicated that an
overwhelming majority of clients had experienced traumatic head
injuries (95%). Finally, with respect to current occupation, the
most commonly selected options were: currently unemployed
(24.1%), supported training/employment (20.4%) and retired
(20.4%).
Data also were collected from caregiver/significant other
(DEX-SO; N = 101) and clinician (DEX-C; N = 64) raters. Within
the caregiver/significant others group, parents (n = 40), spouses
(n = 38), siblings (n = 9), adult offspring (n = 6), friends (n = 5),
and other family members (n = 2) were represented.
RESULTS
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics and reliability coefficients
for the DEX-S (i.e., self-ratings) as well as the DEX-SO and the
DEX-C.
Cronbach’s alpha coefficients and their 95% confidence inter-
vals suggest excellent scale score reliability within each respondent
group. However, upper bound estimates, particularly for the
DEX-SO and DEX-C, suggest that item redundancy may be of
concern (Streiner, 2003). As noted in previous research, DEX-SO
scores were higher than DEX-S ratings, although this difference
was not statistically significant (LSD, p = 0.07). DEX-C scores
Table 1 | Means, standard deviations, and Cronbach’s alpha
coefficients for DEX scales.
Questionnaire category N Mean
Standard deviation
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient (95%
confidence intervals)
DEX-Self 113 29.08
16.54
0.93 (0.90−0.94)
DEX-Significant other 101 33.63
19.28
0.95 (0.94−0.96)
DEX-Clinician 64 23.81
18.78
0.97 (0.96−0.98)
were lowest of all and differed significantly from DEX-SO scores
(LSD, p = 0.001).
Intra-class correlation coefficients and their 95% confidence
intervals were calculated between DEX-S and DEX-SO items;
DEX-S and DEX-C items; and DEX-SO and DEX-C items. This
analysis permits one to determine the degree of consistency
between self-, significant other, and clinician ratings, with ICC
values >0.74 representing an excellent level of agreement; values
between 0.60 and 0.74 reflecting good agreement; and values
between 0.40 and 0.59 representing fair agreement. Absolute
agreement ICCs were estimated using a one-way random effects
model (see Table 2).
The average level of agreement between self- and significant
other ratings was 0.41 (SD = 0.09). The averages for self- and
clinician ratings and significant other and clinician ratings were
0.15 (SD = 0.09) and 0.31 (SD = 0.13), respectively. Post-hoc
testing revealed that these averages differed significantly: self and
significant other vs. self and clinician (LSD, p < 0.001); self
and significant other vs. significant other and clinician (LSD,
p < 0.01); self and clinician vs. significant other and clinician
(LSD, p < 0.001). Importantly, the average level of agreement
between self and significant other ratings was at the bottom end
of the stratum denoting “fair agreement”. The remaining averages
were poor. These findings suggest there is only nominal consis-
tency in ratings on the DEX among patients, their caregivers, and
clinicians.
To assess the dimensionality of the DEX when completed by
patients, significant others and clinicians, three principal axis
factor (PAF) analyses were conducted. This factor analytic tech-
nique is recommended when data have the potential to be non-
normally distributed (Finch and West, 1997). Diagnostics, such
as the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy
and Bartlett’s test of sphericity, were conducted for each PAF
analysis and deemed to be satisfactory (i.e., KMO exceeded 0.90
and Bartlett’s test was statistically significant permitting one to
reject the null hypothesis that associations among the DEX items
may be represented as an identity matrix). Parallel analysis and
inspection of the unrotated factor solution were used to assist with
factor retention.
When completed by patients, a one-factor solution appeared to
best represent the data (i.e., the unrotated solution revealed that
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Table 2 | Intra-class correlation coefficients and their 95% confidence intervals between DEX-Self (DEX-S), DEX-Significant Other (DEX-SO) and
DEX-Clinician (DEX-C).
DEX item DEX-S and DEX-SO DEX-S and DEX-C DEX-SO and DEX-C
1. Has problems understanding what other people mean unless
they keep things simple and straightforward
0.35 (0.16−0.51) 0.00 (−0.25−0.24) 0.19 (−0.08−0.44)
2. Acts without thinking, doing the first thing that comes to mind 0.45 (0.28−0.59) 0.20 (−0.05−0.42) 0.24 (−0.03−0.48)
3. Sometimes talks about events or details that never actually
happened, but s/he believes did happen
0.30 (0.11−0.47) 0.09 (−0.15−0.33) 0.51 (0.28−0.69)
4. Has difficulty thinking ahead or planning for the future 0.43 (0.26−0.58) 0.07 (−0.18−0.31) 0.49 (0.26−0.67)
5. Sometimes gets over-excited about things and can be a bit
“over-the-top” at these times
0.40 (0.23−0.55) 0.13 (−0.12−0.36) 0.48 (0.24−0.66)
6. Gets events mixed up with each other, and gets confused about
the correct order of events
0.34 (0.16−0.50) 0.19 (−0.05−0.42) 0.28 (0.01−0.51)
7. Has difficulty realizing the extent of his/her problems and is
unrealistic about the future
0.20 (0.01−0.38) 0.00 (−0.25−0.24) 0.31 (0.05−0.54)
8. Seems lethargic, or unenthusiastic about things 0.33 (0.14−0.49) 0.13 (−0.11−0.37) 0.04 (−0.23−0.31)
9. Does or says embarrassing things when in the company of
others
0.49 (0.33−0.62) 0.26 (0.02−0.47) 0.34 (0.08−0.56)
10. Really wants to do something 1 min, but couldn’t care less
about it the next
0.56 (0.41−0.68) 0.29 (0.05−0.50) 0.35 (0.09−0.56)
11. Has difficulty showing emotion 0.35 (0.16−0.51) 0.16 (−0.09−0.39) 0.11 (−0.16−0.37)
12. Loses his/her temper at the slightest thing 0.54 (0.39−0.67) 0.11 (−0.14−0.35) 0.28 (0.01−0.51)
13. Seems unconcerned about how s/he should behave in certain
situations
0.46 (0.29−0.60) 0.19 (−0.06−0.41) 0.54 (0.31−0.71)
14. Finds it hard to stop repeating saying or doing things once
started
0.50 (0.34−0.63) 0.01 (−0.24−0.25) 0.40 (0.15−0.61)
15. Tends to be very restless and “can’t sit still” for any length of
time
0.40 (0.23−0.55) 0.06 (−0.18−0.30) 0.24 (−0.03−0.48)
16. Finds it difficult to stop doing something even if s/he knows
s/he shouldn’t
0.43 (0.26−0.58) 0.25 (0.00−0.46) 0.23 (−0.04−0.47)
17. Will say one thing, but do something different 0.46 (0.29−0.60) 0.15 (−0.10−0.38) 0.34 (0.07−0.56)
18. Finds it difficult to keep his/her mind on something, and is
easily distracted
0.29 (0.10−0.46) 0.18 (−0.06−0.41) 0.32 (0.06−0.55)
19. Has trouble making decisions, or deciding what s/he wants to
do
0.50 (0.33−0.63) 0.26 (0.02−0.47) 0.23 (−0.04−0.47)
20. Is unaware of, or unconcerned about, how others feel about
his/her behavior
0.38 (0.20−0.54) 0.29 (−0.05−0.50) 0.27 (0.01−0.51)
no items loaded uniquely on any factor besides the first one and
there was a negligible difference between the eigenvalue associated
with factor 2 [1.09] for the random data and the eigenvalue
associated with factor 2 [1.49] for the real data). The eigenvalue
associated with the first factor was 8.46 (42.29% of the variance
accounted for). Factor loadings ranged from 0.33 to 0.78 (see
Table 3).
A similar solution emerged when significant others completed
the DEX. Specifically, one factor appeared to best represent
the data (eigenvalue = 10.46, accounting for 52.32% of the
variance). The factor loadings ranged from 0.58 to 0.83 (see
Table 3). Finally, a one-factor solution also was optimal for
the clinicians (eigenvalue = 12.54, accounting for 62.72% of
the variance). For this group, factor loadings ranged from
0.49 to 0.92.
DISCUSSION
This study sought to address two questions: (1) what is the
inter-rater reliability of the DEX when completed by patients,
their significant others, and clinicians; and (2) what is the factor
structure of the DEX for these three groups?
Results suggest there is only nominal agreement in item ratings
on the DEX among patients, their caregivers, and clinicians.
The fact that self-rating and ratings by others is different is not
surprising—the very purpose of the measure is to detect a lack
of self-awareness in people with brain injury, operationalized as
a discrepancy between the patient and their significant other.
However, it is concerning that there is a large discrepancy in the
ratings of other people who know the patient well: significant
others and clinicians attributed quite variable scores across the
range of items, indicating a low level of agreement between
raters. This finding is in keeping with previous research which
showed that the DEX ratings of significant others (mainly family
members rather than clinicians) were variable (Barker et al.,
2011).
The fact that third party raters can differ quite significantly
when reporting about the same individual raises an important
question about the reliability of the DEX. It could be suggested
that clinician respondents might, by virtue of their professional
training, be able to provide a more accurate appraisal of the level
of executive function impairment. This is difficult to confirm,
however, since clinical judgment is inherently subjective. In the
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Table 3 | Principal axis factor loadings for DEX when completed by patients, significant others, and clinicians.
DEX item Patients Significant Others Clinicians
1. Has problems understanding what other people mean unless they keep things
simple and straightforward
0.406 0.610 0.705
2. Acts without thinking, doing the first thing that comes to mind 0.777 0.647 0.920
3. Sometimes talks about events or details that never actually happened, but
s/he believes did happen
0.326 0.579 0.691
4. Has difficulty thinking ahead or planning for the future 0.548 0.720 0.819
5. Sometimes gets over-excited about things and can be a bit “over-the-top” at
these times
0.547 0.651 0.813
6. Gets events mixed up with each other, and gets confused about the correct
order of events
0.620 0.689 0.833
7. Has difficulty realizing the extent of his/her problems and is unrealistic about
the future
0.567 0.773 0.789
8. Seems lethargic, or unenthusiastic about things 0.542 0.630 0.636
9. Does or says embarrassing things when in the company of others 0.644 0.790 0.826
10. Really wants to do something 1 min, but couldn’t care less about it the next 0.769 0.685 0.793
11. Has difficulty showing emotion 0.559 0.587 0.486
12. Loses his/her temper at the slightest thing 0.631 0.722 0.692
13. Seems unconcerned about how s/he should behave in certain situations 0.726 0.831 0.899
14. Finds it hard to stop repeating saying or doing things once started 0.731 0.696 0.788
15. Tends to be very restless and “can’t sit still” for any length of time 0.646 0.651 0.739
16. Finds it difficult to stop doing something even if s/he knows s/he shouldn’t 0.645 0.712 0.860
17. Will say one thing, but do something different 0.769 0.823 0.835
18. Finds it difficult to keep his/her mind on something, and is easily distracted 0.683 0.774 0.696
19. Has trouble making decisions, or deciding what s/he wants to do 0.676 0.712 0.734
20. Is unaware of, or unconcerned about, how others feel about his/her behavior 0.544 0.772 0.924
authors’ experience, neuropsychological testing may also not
be especially helpful in this regard, as performance on tests
of executive function does not always correlate strongly with
functional ability (Chaytor et al., 2006; Razani et al., 2007). It
may be the case that the best and, perhaps, only reliable way to
measure executive function impairment in everyday situations is
through a combination of behavioral, task-based measures such
as the Multiple Errands Test (Shallice and Burgess, 1991) and a
consensus-based response to the DEX where a discussion of the
individual items between the respondents may lead to a more
accurate description of the problems encountered by the person
with brain injury. The feasibility of including ecologically-valid
behavioral testing has been improved with the development of
virtual reality-based technologies. For example, a virtual reality
version of the Multiple Errands Test (Raspelli, 2014) has been
developed and offers the potential to measure real-life challenges
coupled with the convenience of being able to do the assessment
within a clinical setting.
With respect to the dimensionality of the DEX, PAF analysis
suggested that a single factor offered the best fit for all three
groups. This finding indicates that DEX items are best construed
as representing a single construct of executive dysfunction. It
should be noted that other researchers have identified a similar
factor structure. For instance, using two independent samples of
community-dwelling persons, Gerstorf et al. (2008) identified a
single factor solution as being optimal for the self-rated version.
Specifically, these authors report that “independent of specifying
an orthogonal or oblique solution, we found that the eigenvalue
for one factor was consistently above 7 whereas four or five
other factors could have been extracted but their eigenvalues were
only marginally larger than 1” (pp. 432–433). We observed a
similar outcome across three different categories of respondent:
self, significant other, and clinician. To our knowledge, only
one other study (Chaytor and Schmitter-Edgecombe, 2007) has
examined the factor structure of the DEX when completed by
third party respondents (N = 46). These researchers identified
a five-component solution, with the first three components cor-
responding well with the inhibition, intentionality, and exec-
utive memory factors specified in other psychometric studies
assessing the self-rated version. The authors conclude that these
three components appear to be replicable whereas components
4 and 5 are, perhaps, idiosyncratic (i.e., components unique to
the specific sample being tested). However, the validity of their
three-component interpretation may be questioned. First, the
authors appear to have relied on the “eigenvalue greater than
1 rule”, which many have argued is among the least accurate
methods for identifying factor/component retention (i.e., it often
results in over-extraction) (Costello and Osborne, 2005). Sec-
ond, although the authors do not provide the intercorrelations
among the components, based on the study conducted by Ger-
storf and associates (Barker et al., 2004), it is possible they are
of sufficient magnitude so as to suggest redundancy (i.e., for
the factors representing inhibition, intentionality, and executive
memory, r-values obtained by Gerstorf et al. (2008) ranged from
0.93 to 0.99).
As with all studies, the current investigation possesses certain
limitations that warrant discussion. First, the number of partici-
pants recruited was modest, especially for the clinician subsample.
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It should be noted, however, that other researchers have published
psychometric assessments of the DEX using similar (or smaller)
numbers of participants (e.g., N = 20 (Amieva et al., 2003); N =
46 (Amieva et al., 2003); N = 93 (Bachmann et al., 2008)). Further,
MacCallum et al. (1999) demonstrate that “rules of thumb” about
sample size are less important than the degree to which a factor
solution is characterized by factor over-determination (i.e., the
number of indicators per factor, with a common ratio being 5:1)
and strong communality values (i.e., the proportion of variance
in each item accounted for by the extracted factor[s]). In the
current study, communality estimates were variable; strong over-
determination was present (i.e., p [variable]: r [factor] ratio was
20:1); and, for the smallest subsample (clinician group), 19 of the
20 variables had large structure coefficients (>0.60) suggesting
that one can be reasonably confident in the reproducibility of
the obtained factor solutions. Larger samples are clearly needed,
however, if one were to conduct subgroup analyses based on
variables such as type of injury, gender of patient, or relationship
between patient and significant other (e.g., spouse vs. sibling).
Another limitation pertains to the small set of variables that
were measured. Gerstorf et al. (2008), for example, assessed a
host of individual difference variables including neuroticism,
depression, subjective health, trait anxiety, positive and negative
affect, and cognitive functioning. In the current study, as only
the DEX and a small number of sociodemographic items (e.g.,
age) were used, the convergent validity of this instrument when
completed by patients, significant others and clinicians could
not be tested. Future studies might consider the use of alter-
native methodologies, such as those used in clinical judgment
studies (e.g., Bachmann et al., 2008), to look at the cues and
weightings used by respondents to arrive at their judgments
regarding the presence and extent of any difficulties in executive
functioning.
In conclusion, our dimensionality evaluation suggests that the
DEX is best construed as a single factor measure of dysexecutive
syndrome. The inter-rater reliability analysis suggests that there
is a low level of agreement in item ratings on the DEX among
patients, their caregivers, and clinicians. The fact that evaluations
by two raters are not highly correlated in reference to the same
patient raises a question about this element of the reliability
of the DEX. While it is well recognized that executive function
deficits occur frequently after traumatic brain injury and this
is often associated with impaired self-awareness, we are as yet
limited in our ability to measure and quantify these impairments.
The difficulties arising from measuring deficits in executive func-
tion also presents challenges in how best to involve patients in
aspects of their own rehabilitation such as patient-determined
goals and outcomes (Hogan et al., 2013) when self-awareness is
compromised.
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